“An Irish emigrant the wrong way out”: Masud Khan Reads James Joyce

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Introduction

Masud Khan is one of the most controversial figures in the history of British psychoanalysis. His remarkably literary, and highly stylized, psychoanalytic writing is populated by prominent European and Anglophone figures identifiable with modernist culture. Accordingly, many of his key theoretical insights emerge from readings of James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Georges Braque, Charles Baudelaire and Friedrich Nietzsche. This reflects Khan’s aristocratic, literary education in the Northern Punjab in the 1940s, where he studied the writing of Joyce, Eliot and Woolf, before traveling to London in 1946 to train as a psychoanalyst. Khan’s life and writing sit at the confluence of major historical forces and cultural movements: the Partition of India in 1947; the canonization of modernist culture in Europe in the postwar period; and mass migration of former colonial subjects to Britain. His life and writing offer an intriguing case study for the afterlife of Euro-modernism as it confronts mass migration and the collapse of imperial power proper. Here, I examine how Joyce’s writing shapes the theoretical contours of key concepts in Khan’s psychoanalytic thought, whilst simultaneously unpacking the cultural and political ramifications of Khan’s deep fascination with Joyce’s work. More specifically, I argue that Joyce provides Khan with the basis of his “epiphanic” psychoanalysis, and also offers the psychoanalyst a highly suggestive notion of exile that becomes key to his conception of his own life as an émigré. This notion of exile, I suggest in conclusion, has ramifications for the most fundamental aspects of self-experience as they are articulated in his psychoanalytic work.

The Life of Masud Khan

A brief biographical sketch provides the necessary background to this essay. Masud Khan was born in Jhemel in the Punjab in 1924, to a family with a military background and whose large properties were gifted to them by the Imperial administration following his grandfather’s support for the British during the rebellion of 1857 (Willoughby 1-5). His education
began with a personal tutor named P.I. Painter, who introduced Khan to classical and contemporary European literatures, and taught him to read and write in English (Hopkins 1-18). Painter, Khan reports, was a senior civil servant who left government service after a philosophical disagreement over the management of the Imperial administration (Hopkins 13).

In 1942, Khan studied for a BA in Political Science at Government College in Lyallpur, and then for a Master’s degree in English Literature in Lahore in 1945. His MA thesis was on James Joyce, and was titled “From Excitement to Epiphany: A Study of Joyce’s Development.” These years between 1940 and 1946 are considered by Khan to be “the matrix of my sensibility” (Hopkins, 13). During Khan’s time at university he became well acquainted with the writing of James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, and Virginia Woolf. Documentary evidence indicates that P.I. Painter was an important access point for Khan in reading Anglophone Modernism (Poore 2012).

Khan traveled to the United Kingdom in 1946, ostensibly to study at Balliol College Oxford, but he instead pursued a training analysis in London. This journey was viewed by Khan as a form of self-exile, owing to the imminent collapse of the feudal order in which he had grown up in the face of growing nationalist sentiments in the Punjab. Following the partition of India in 1947, Khan never applied for Pakistani citizenship, so his half-brother Tahir ran his estates in the Punjab. This moment marked the beginning of Khan’s sustained hostility to the postcolonial governments of Pakistan who, to varying degrees, challenged the economic and political hegemony, locally and nationally, of feudal land-owning families placed into positions of power by British imperial policy in the late nineteenth century (Gilmartin 35).

Khan began a psychoanalytic training in London after a meeting with analyst John Bowlby (Hopkins 22). His vast inherited wealth meant that Khan was able to afford three separate training analyses—one with Ella Sharpe; one with John Rickman; and one with Donald Winnicott (Hopkins 55). Khan worked closely with Winnicott on the production of his major papers and books as well as publishing four books of his own, collated from numerous journal articles: The Privacy of the Self (1974); Alienation in Perversions (1979); Hidden Selves (1983); and When Spring Comes (1988). Khan’s work is unique in combining the research and ethos of British Object-Relations with the emphasis placed on language and signification in French psychoanalysis. Khan himself cultivated friendships with a number of French psychoanalysts (including Jacques Lacan) and served as the foreign editor for the Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse.

Khan’s later career was controversial and scandalous. Former analysand Wynne Godley revealed the extent of Khan’s eccentric, abusive and anti-Semitic behavior in a shocking article in the London Review of Books in 2001. Khan was dismissed from the British Psychoanalytic Society in 1989 following the publication of his last book owing to an
anti-Semitic tract he composed about a Jewish patient. The numerous other transgressions Khan committed with patients—ranging from physical aggression to sexual relationships—have been well documented by recent scholars of psychoanalysis (Boynton 2003; Borossa 1997 and 2012).

Masud Khan and Postcolonial Studies

Masud Khan is a peculiar and problematic figure for postcolonial literary studies. His aristocratic background, and veneration of the “feudal” order maintained by the British in colonial India, puts him at odds with theoretical paradigms in the field that describe resistance, subalternity, ambivalence and hybridity in relation to Imperialism. Openly hostile in his diaries to anti-colonial and socialist struggles in India and Pakistan, as well as with certain aspects of left politics more generally, Khan is very much at odds with the prevailing political tenor of postcolonial studies, and cannot stake any real claim to marginality, even if such a thing could be offered as a justification for examining his work. This is to say little of the outrageous and jarring anti-Semitic racism that blights his final book, *When Spring Comes*. Indeed, Khan’s relationship with race is also mediated through the kinds of engagements with European modernist culture that I outline here, but requires a lengthy, and separate, discussion of its own. As a psychoanalyst whose writing is saturated with literary, cultural and philosophical reflections, Khan should be of interest to critics keen to explore the complex and ambivalent interactions of psychoanalysis and literature, especially in its modernist incarnations. His unusual position, though, as a non-European author and practitioner of psychoanalysis, raises striking questions about the handling of empire and race in both psychoanalysis and modernism, as well as related questions of the limits and tensions inherent in both those movements (Borossa 1997; 2012). Khan’s work is an exemplary instance of the non-European reader of Freud to whom Edward Said gestures in his late lecture on *Moses and Monotheism* (Said 43).

Khan’s life and writing might indeed be read comparatively alongside a raft of other figures from Indian literary and cultural history who encountered anglophone modernism in both Europe and on the subcontinent. Novelist Mulk Raj Anand, whose work is increasingly coming to the attention of scholars and critics, worked with T.S. Eliot at *The Criterion* and with the Bloomsbury group more generally, authoring the seminal *Untouchables* in 1935, a modernist novel critiquing the caste system and imperialism in India (Eatough and Wollaeger 207-214). Likewise, Sajjad Zaheer also spent time studying and writing in Europe, producing the Joyce-inflected *A Night in London* in 1938, a novel describing the revolutionary fervour of young anti-colonial intellectuals from the subcontinent, alongside critiques of race and class in British
society (Zaheer vi). Many of the writers associated with the Indian Progressive Writers Association, whose politically and aesthetically radical short story collection *Angare* was censored on publication in 1932, cultivated connections with the European avant-garde in the colonial centre (indeed, one of the foundational meetings of the IPWA was held in London). More critical discussion of how European modernism was remade, critiqued and repurposed in the anti-colonial movements of the 1930s and 1940s is sorely needed. Masud Khan, nevertheless, emerges from some two decades of cultural transactions between south Asian and European modernisms, and his work is part of the legacy of that shared cultural space.

Khan claimed that he “coexist[ed] parallelly in multiple realities, external as well as internal” (Khan qtd. in Hopkins 36). Indeed, this tension is exemplified by his performance of a number of jarring characters. He tries to become, this thesis argues, a European modernist *par excellence* (smoking exquisite French cigarettes and collecting Braque lithographs from exclusive Parisian dealers); he cultivates the image of “Prince Khan,” the carrier of his “feudal tradition” in exile (Poore 2012); and he was also, one commentator notes, impossibly other: “black, and rich, and having sex with white women” (Hopkins 427, 387). Khan was “never Europeanized” (ibid). Khan’s cosmopolitanism is the expression of powerful engagements with major modernist authors and represents a transnational “style of living” that he opposes, in his self-exile, to the nationalist cultural politics of anti-colonial India and Pakistan. Khan’s self-fashioning in Europe then might be examined in relation to more recent critical attempts to recuperate a range of ideas about the political and ethical value of cosmopolitanism as responses to imperialism, genocide, and displacement in the twentieth century. Khan’s self-exile—drawing as it does on modernist models—experiments with the intellectual and political possibilities of a life beyond the nation-state, cultivating a contrapuntal interplay of different selves.

As a psychoanalyst who rejected Pakistani citizenship and was characterised as “Savile Row with a dash of the Raj” (Boynton 2003), Khan's work presents fresh material for contemporary debates concerning the valency of terms like cosmopolitanism and transnationalism as they appear in the two increasingly overlapping fields of modernist and postcolonial studies (Mao and Walkowitz 2008; Snaith 2014). For example, Rebecca Walkowitz’s *Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation* argues for the existence of “critical cosmopolitanism” exemplified by her genealogy of modernist expatriate writers: Joseph Conrad, James Joyce, Salman Rushdie, Kazuo Ishiguro, and W.G. Sebald (2). This cosmopolitanism is directly counterposed to the frame of the nation state: it involves the “useful cosmopolitanism of belonging beyond the polis or the nation” (5). Whilst this critical cosmopolitanism is, for Walkowitz, only one amongst many, its global imagination of “citizenship, world war, empire, and decolonization” mitigates against “xenophobia and nativist conceptions of community” (5).
Likewise, Michael Rothberg’s 2009 increasingly influential comparative literary history of the Holocaust and decolonization, *Multidirectional Memory*, offers a reassessment of the cosmopolitan ideal in contemporary writing on empire. Rothberg’s book foregrounds texts and artists that implicitly or explicitly bring together multiple legacies of suffering, and it is cosmopolitanism, not anti-colonial Marxist internationalism, that facilitates such identifications and exchanges. Indeed, such cross-cultural remembering entails an often ambiguous immersion in an another cultural history of persecution, shaping the production of one’s own narrative of oppression. The ethical ambition of Rothberg’s book, which is the first to explicitly draw together the Holocaust and the fallout of decolonization, is that recognition of shared and imbricated legacies of suffering in the twentieth century offer a sense of commonality that could be the foundation of a new polity.

Indeed, Rothberg suggests, his study directs us towards “a multidirectional ethics that combines the capacious open-endedness of the universal with the concrete, situational demands of the particular” (22), a gesture reminiscent of modernist (particularly Joycean) descriptions of the relation of universal and particular, local and international. Rothberg’s multidirectional ethics produce a politics that similarly veers towards “a notion of transnational, comparative justice” (22). The multidirectional imaginary is unquestionably cosmopolitan, and Rothberg’s cultural connections are typified by their rejection of the nation-state as the ultimate frame of reference. Indeed, discussing Aimé Césaire’s *Lettre à Maurice Thorez*, Rothberg suggests, it articulates “a multidirectional universalism...that approaches contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism” (99). Césaire is exemplary in furthering “a multidirectional cosmopolitanism” (70). But it is the limits of Khan’s vision—his modernist-centric outlook—that might allow a critique of Rothberg’s project to emerge, with Khan’s version of modernist cosmopolitanism exemplifying a cautionary counterweight to Rothberg’s positive vision.

Recognizing the multidirectionality of political identities might be the royal road to a politically redeemed cosmopolitanism, but in Khan’s case the cosmopolitan opens up plenty of political antagonisms as well. The relation of Joyce’s writing to empire has been thoroughly interrogated by recent scholarship, provoking a range of arguments about whether Joyce can be included “under the increasingly capacious umbrella of the postcolonial,” though it is my sense that Khan’s fascination with Joyce does not align with the range of postcolonial readings of Joyce currently on offer (Wollaeger 69). The *Ulysses* Khan encountered at university and subsequently investigated psychoanalytically did not have the status as a resistant, “subaltern” or postcolonial text, and his own elite position circumvents seeing his reading of Joyce as radical or even necessarily anti-colonial, even though it may be so for others reading and producing modernist literature in Khan’s immediate political context. Rather, Joyce offers Khan a model of exilic self-fashioning that is inscribed in Khan’s
psychoanalytic writing and allows him to recast his migration in the image of that literary trope. This is not, of course, to designate postcolonial, “semicolonial” (Attridge 2000), or race-focused readings of Joyce’s work as inappropriate or impossible—but in this case, the interpretative possibilities of Khan’s reading of Joyce are circumscribed by his elite position and the particular significations attached to European modernist literature in his period. Indeed, Khan’s interest in Joyce typifies the more traditional, canonized Joyce of Modernist literary studies whose discursive hegemony is critiqued by Raymond Williams, whose own arguments about the politics of modernism have been recently reprised and elaborated in Neil Lazarus’ 2011 study The Postcolonial Unconscious (Lazarus 27-28).

Masud Khan’s Exile

Joyce’s exilic literary project is the model for Khan’s own attempts at self-fashioning. Indeed, in his construction of himself as unintegrated outsider he is quite careful to differentiate himself from a migrant or émigré. Writing in When Spring Comes in 1988, Khan notes:

Having lived and worked in London for forty years, I have learned that self-exile is quite different from being an émigré. I did not have to fabricate a new identity as a British citizen and, while I am open to learn from the culture in which I have been living, the tenacious hold that my own roots and culture have on me has strongly influenced my way of working. (200)

Despite Khan’s insistence on his exilic status, he is not strictly speaking a refugee. Khan was not forcibly displaced from his home in then Northern India (unlike many others following Partition in 1947), and did not flee from persecution like Sigmund Freud or Hannah Arendt. Like that of Joyce, Khan’s is a “self-appointed exile” (180), a “wayward and arrogant...style of living” that is cultivated as a source of creative action (Hopkins, 34). Indeed, there is a remarkable resonance between Stephen Dedalus’ statement of intent in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man—“…using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use, silence, exile, and cunning” (Portrait 191)—and Khan’s own reflections on his ideal environment: “I need an experience of voluntary, sustained and progressive loss to find and establish my private discipline of retreat, reserve and silence” (Khan, cited by Hopkins, 167). Khan draws, like Joyce, on the language of discipline and withdrawal—the “arms” and “defence” of Portrait—to describe this “mode of life or art,” a self-exile that is ultimately self-fashioning: the establishment of Khan’s “private discipline.”

The construction of this divided and wayward subjectivity will be familiar to readers of Raymond Williams, who critiques modernism precisely for construing this version of selfhood as universally and uniquely responsive to modernity. For Williams, self-exile is a
“characteristic modern figure” (The Long Revolution 108). Self-exile is a project of individual self-fashioning, where what is at stake is “to maintain the individuality which is the term of his separateness,” entailing a refusal of social reality in favour of “alternative principles to which his whole personal reality is committed” (108). Williams’ language, in his description of the character of the exilic, hinges on an antagonism between “personal reality” and the wider social field:

The self-exile could, if he chose, live at ease in his own country, but to do so would be to deny his personal reality. Sometimes he goes away, on principle, but as often he stays, yet still, on principle, feels separate. The Bolsheviks had a useful term for this, in ‘internal émigré’, and if we realize that this is not confined to politics we can use it to describe a very important modern relationship. This kind of self-exile lives and moves about in the society into which he was born, but rejects its purposes and despises its values...He knows himself to be different, and the pressure of his activity is to preserve this difference. (108)

Khan’s fascination with exile is indicative of this more general trend in the critical characterization of modernism in the postwar period. Hugh Kenner’s critical writings defined modernist culture for a generation of scholars and readers, and his study of T.S. Eliot, The Invisible Poet, is indeed to be found in Khan’s library. The range of modernist references in Khan’s work mirrors the institutional and critical formation Hugh Kenner describes as “International Modernism.” Like Kenner, Khan reads modernism as a collection of “certain masterpieces” (Kenner 49) (Eliot’s Four Quartets, Joyce’s Ulysses and Beckett’s Waiting for Godot are all works admired by Khan and Kenner). Khan’s understanding of modernism, like Kenner’s, emphasizes a Euro-centric inter-city cosmopolitanism, composed by exiles and expatriates (Gluzman 39-41). The centrality of exile to Kenner’s modernism placed Eliot, Joyce and Pound in cities unfamiliar to them and valorized the transient and contingent experience of the migrant, and it is this cultural discourse that frames Khan’s vision of himself and psychoanalysis in postwar London.

Travelling with Joyce

Khan’s student copy of Ulysses demonstrates the pervasiveness of Williams’ idea of modernism. Indeed, it indicates that Khan’s style of living is based upon a very particular literary identification. The front endpaper and flyleaf of Khan’s 1932 Ulysses are heavily marked with dates, places, postage stamps and stickers (fig.1). The dates and places Khan marks on his copy catalogue places Khan visited (Paris, Reims, Monte Carlo) and his places of residence in London (Harley Street, Palace Court, Hans Crescent). The variegated dates and places, continually updated throughout Khan’s life, not only index his own travels but countersign Joyce’s own creative and spiritual exile signaled at the end of the novel: “Trieste-Zurich-Paris, 1914-1921.” This intensely transnational
composite of geographical locations evokes Shem the penman, the “Europasianized Afferyank” of Finnegans Wake (hereafter FW, 191.04). The bilingualism of these pages also gestures towards the composite polyglot language of FW and Joyce’s interest in what the critic Laurent Milesi calls a “pluridialectal idioglossary” (Milesi 4). This mixing of media and temporalities on the front endpaper and flyleaf—postage stamps from various countries, stationary from his office, handwriting—exemplifies the fragments of the everyday that Ulysses stitches together. The multiple date stamps of Khan’s Ulysses not only mirror Joyce’s exile but also turn Ulysses into something resembling an ad-hoc passport, a symbolic substitute for the Pakistani citizenship that he refused in 1947, choosing instead UK citizenship.

Fig. 1 Front Endpaper/Front Flyleaf, Ulysses, (Hamburg: The Odyssey Press, 1932). The Library of Masud Khan. Photo reproduced with permission of the Hellenic Society of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, Athens, Greece.
It is unsurprising, then, that the epigraph to “Freud and the Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility” is taken from FW: “self-exiled in upon his ego” (HS 3). In the front endpaper of the book itself we see a direct link to exile: Khan writes in the lower third of the page in red ink the Urdu words hum safar, which can be translated alternately as “fellow traveler” or “we exiled.” The book itself, as an object, becomes Khan’s traveling companion, as does the figure of Joyce, the modernist abroad.

Khan’s other copies of Ulysses index his sense of homelessness in other striking ways. A seemingly prescient bookmark appears in Khan’s 1946 edition of the novel: a voucher or ticket for a complimentary “conversation class” in French, German, English or Spanish at an Oxford Street language school in London (fig. 2). Whilst we cannot know whether the voucher was used or not, it is a striking marker of Khan’s alterity and his cosmopolitan aspirations. Indeed, the presence of the voucher in the novel as bookmark demonstrates the ways in which Khan brings his own migrant experience into contact with the modernist versions of self-creation that Joyce’s text has come to exemplify. Khan fancies himself in his final book, When Spring Comes, as a polyglot, boasting of acquiring “seven languages” (136). But Khan’s trumpeting of his own multilingualism is also accompanied by a sense that he was never entirely comfortable in any of his adopted languages and, although an often skilled writer of English prose, he apparently had a number of difficulties with English prepositions meaning that “Hogarth had to do a lot of work on his typescripts” (Hopkins, 438). “At times,” his editor Mark Paterson writes, “his writing was faulty” (438).

Fig. 2 Bookmark: James Joyce, Ulysses: The Corrected Text edited by Hans Walter Gabler. From the library of Masud Khan, photo reproduced with permission of the Hellenic Society of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, Athens, Greece.
More strikingly, though, Khan misspells “Hum safar” in the front of his student copy of *Ulysses*, and Khan’s sense of discomfort in what is supposed to be his mother tongue is gestured to elsewhere in his writing. In a case history with the similarly privileged and cosmopolitan Muslim woman “Aisha” in *When Spring Comes*, Khan remarks on his own sense of alienation from, and lack of facility with, the particular Urdu dialects through which they converse in the course of her analysis. “My Chakwali Punjab,” Khan writes, “is no match for [her] Chanauti accent and clipped phrasing. Her vocabulary is much larger than mine” (176). Aisha, like Khan, moves between different languages and cultures as she moves around the analytic space. “She had talked in her native Punjabi mixed with English and also some French,” Khan notes (176). When “sitting up and facing me” “she spoke English and French,” but when “lying down” she speaks in Urdu and “Chanuti Punjab” (181). The linguistic indeterminacy of this scene in Khan’s writing, rehearsed between pages marked by Khan in Joyce’s novel, underlines the centrality of this cultivated homelessness in Khan’s production of his own self-image in London.

Khan’s psychoanalytic writing mobilises Joyce in two distinct but related ways. On the one hand, Joyce’s ideas about the epiphanic are translated by Khan into a theory of psychoanalytic transformation by re-imagining the concept of epiphany as being in dialogue with the work of Michael Balint. This concept of epiphany in psychoanalysis contributes to Khan’s anti-hermeneutics, which minimises the role of interpretation and privileges the inherent “privacy” of self-experience. But epiphany in Joyce is also, I argue, tied thematically and intellectually to exile and the modernist project of exilic self-fashioning, in which, as I indicate above, Khan is clearly engaged. The fundamental hidden-ness of the self, especially as this relates to what Khan terms the “dreaming experience,” is the expression in Khan’s writing of his fascination with the unintegrated figure of the exile and émigré, and ultimately derives from Joyce. In this paper I want to elaborate the impact of his encounter with Joyce’s work on these related aspects of his theoretical work. Indeed, the dreaming subject in Khan’s writing can ultimately be understood as his attempts to respond to his own postcolonial modernity; it is a response constructed through his intense fascination with Joyce’s writing. The embedding of Joyce’s conception of exile into Khan’s consciousness has implications, I will argue in conclusion, for the psychoanalytic theory he produces: his is a version of subjectivity that translates Joycean exile into psychoanalytic principles.

Epiphanic Psychoanalysis

In *The Privacy of the Self*, Khan’s 1974 work, we have the explicit use of Joyce’s *Stephen Hero* to articulate what could be termed an “epiphanic
psychoanalysis.” For Khan, the psychoanalytic process should not be concerned principally with the use of interpretation by the analyst to articulate the meaning of dreams, symptoms, and slips of the tongue in the treatment of patients. Interpretation for Khan (and his mentor Donald Winnicott) is a form of playing within the psychoanalytic process and purely the basis for establishing a dialogue between analyst and patient. For Donald Winnicott, “[p]sychotherapy is to do with two people playing together,” and interpretation is a pretext for the creation of an environment that engenders mutuality and exchange (Winnicott 56). Interpretation and metapsychological language, for Khan, are forms of “self-cure” for analysts who must come to terms with the inherent unknowability and spontaneity of the unconscious (Khan, The Privacy of the Self, hereafter Privacy 97). This notion of the unconscious as a figure for the limits of knowledge about the self and the other is what gives Khan’s book its title—The Privacy of the Self.

In order to bring this respect for the “privacy” or unknowability of the self into psychoanalytic thought, Khan turns to Joyce’s theory of epiphany: “The actualization of self-experience in the patient through the analytic situation is very similar to what James Joyce in Stephen Hero christened as his epiphanies” (Privacy 296). Khan goes on to quote Joyce:

> By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. (296)

This is Khan’s alternative to the “logic of structural conflicts and data” that he feels characterizes the “patently classical situation” and relies on interpreting the vicissitudes of the drives (295). By contrast, for Khan the Joycean epiphany embodies a different style of relating within the analytic situation:

> Through a psychic, affective, and environmental holding of the person of the patient in the clinical situation, I facilitate experiences that I cannot anticipate or program, any more than the patient can. When these actualize, these are surprising, both for the patient and for me, and release quite unexpected new processes in the patient. (295)

For Khan, the theoretical heritage that embodies such principles within psychoanalysis is twofold: Michael Balint’s concept of the “new beginning” and Donald Winnicott’s notion of the transitional object (Balint 135-55 and Winnicott ch.1). Writing in a draft of the Introduction to the French language edition of Winnicott’s Therapeutic Consultations, Khan notes:

> Winnicott was well aware that his concept of the transitional object had many close correspondences to some of the concepts in literature and art...Similarly, the aesthetics of Mallarmé and Joyce’s concept of the epiphany are trying to discuss the same type of human activity and experience.
The transitional object, for Winnicott, is an object that the infant both “finds” (in the external world) and “creates” for itself. The object both presents itself and is elaborated by the child, and the transitional space is that space between the external world of objects and the child’s experience of his or her own interiority and body, one constantly renegotiated by the child and the external world. Khan and Balint’s concepts of the new beginning and epiphanic psychoanalysis take place in this same transitional space, and in doing so stress the autonomy and dignity of the patient—the object—in psychoanalysis. For Balint, the new relation between analyst and patient that crystallizes from the “unsuspecting arglos state” (Basic Fault 135) is one of mutuality and reciprocity: the analyst is “unobtrusive” and is experienced as a real object rather than a purveyor of interpretations or sadistic master (175).

Khan’s brand of object-relations re-imagines Joyce’s notion of the epiphany. The links Khan makes between Balint, Winnicott and Joyce, make it possible to read Joyce’s writing on epiphany as insisting upon, rather than denying, the autonomy of the object, which has radical implications for Khan’s own sense of his psychoanalytic practice. The writing of the epiphanic in Joyce, seen through this psychoanalytic lens, becomes about breaching the border between unsymbolizable, pre-verbal experience and aesthetic representation. This striking approach to the epiphany should be contrasted with the approach taken by Vicki Mahaffey and Liesl Olson, who, in their recent writing on the Joycean epiphany, suggest both “narrative” and “dramatic” epiphanies lift Stephen Dedalus out of the world of everyday experience into a mean-spirited solipsism (Mahaffey 176). For Mahaffey, such writings serve to “present the nascent artist as inevitable Hero,” and the “dramatic” epiphanies “reduce the stature of those around [the narrator]” (173, 174). Liesl Olson, writing about Ulysses in her 2009 book Modernism and the Ordinary, suggests the “lists” of Leopold Bloom are democratic, inclusive and celebratory of everyday experience, whereas the epiphanies of Stephen Dedalus are self-aggrandizing and alienating (33-42).

Conversely, though, Khan’s interest is in the Joyce of Stephen Hero and the theory of epiphany set out there. This passage in Stephen Hero might lead us, after reading Khan, to a different attitude towards the nature of the object:

First we recognize that the object is one integral thing, then we recognize that it is an organized composite structure, a thing in fact…we recognize that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany. (qtd. Mahaffey 178)

The recognition of the object that Joyce describes is quite different from the epiphanies in his later writing that Olson suggests are ironized, with Joyce quite deliberately mocking Stephen’s aesthetic flight from ordinary experience. Instead, it is the whatness or realness of the object that impinges on the viewing subject. The object is given a “soul” that has the
agency to “leap” to “us” from the vestment of its appearance. Indeed, it has a depth that goes beyond such “vestment” and surface function. The object, rather than the solipsistic viewing subject, “achieves” the epiphany, a moment at which the object articulates and addresses itself to the subject in a reciprocal process. The ethical responsibility of the artist that Joyce identifies in epiphany—“it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments”—is concerned primarily with the delicacy and fragility of the object (Joyce 196). In other words, the artist must write without destroying the soul, the singularity, or the whatness of an interaction with the thing. Khan’s drawing together of Joyce’s epiphanies and Balint’s “new beginning,” and emphasising the transitional character of these experiences, means that the former is re-imagined as belonging properly to the field of two-person psychology, which itself is a novel treatment of this particular concept in Joyce.

The consequences of this in Khan’s psychoanalysis are to produce a theory that re-reads a range of modernist texts through putting them into dialogue with the British Object Relations school of psychoanalytic thought. Khan’s work is founded on the idea of the self as “private,” “hidden” and not necessarily amenable to the hermeneutic procedures on which psychoanalytic authority is founded. Khan often presents the interpretation of the psychoanalyst as persecutory, arguing for the therapeutic effectiveness of “the judicious withholding of therapeutic intervention, either through excessive interpretation or reassurance.” What is entailed here is an unobtrusiveness that culminates in what Khan paradoxically terms “un-interpretation” (Privacy 168). In “On Communicating and Not Communicating,” Donald Winnicott likewise finds himself “staking a claim...to the right not to communicate. This was a protest from the core of me to the frightening fantasy of being infinitely exploited … the fantasy of being found” (179). Winnicott rejects what the writer Adam Phillips terms “overinterpretive analyst” (Phillips 61). For Khan, the foregoing of interpretation is crucial because “no patient is totally knowable as a person, to himself or the analyst. And this final privacy is, perhaps, what we should never transgress clinically” (Hidden Selves, hereafter HS 180).

The right not to be found—not to be fixed in place by interpretation—is at the centre of Khan’s conception of psychoanalysis. This attitude towards the patient, privileging of the “privacy” of the self and essential hiddenness of subject are the translation, into Khan’s psychoanalytic ethics, of the motif of exile in Joyce’s writing. This motif has particular urgency in Khan’s psychoanalytic work because of the ways in which exile was crucial to this psychoanalyst’s understanding of his position as a non-white émigré in postwar London.
Khan Reading Joyce

There is ample evidence that Khan sustained a lifelong interest in Joyce’s writing, beginning with his (unfortunately now lost) study of Joyce for his MA degree in Lahore. Wynne Godley’s account of his treatment recalls that the psychoanalyst, giving Godley a lift in his car, “produced a book of poems by James Joyce from the pouch in the door and told me that he read them when he was stuck in traffic jams” (25). Khan himself owned four copies of *Ulysses*, one of which is a 1946 edition by The Modern Library, one a 1986 Penguin edition edited by Joyce biographer Richard Ellmann, one the 1932 Odyssey Press edition, and the fourth the exquisitely crafted Limited Editions Club version of 1935, with illustrations by Henri Matisse. The earliest date inscribed on Khan’s 1932 edition is “London, 1946” making it clear that *Ulysses* was amongst the first things that Khan read on arrival. Khan’s interest in *Ulysses* stretches across his entire writing career: from his student days in Lahore, with the Odyssey Press edition; to the 1986 Ellmann edition, purchased three years before the end of his life and clearly marked up with annotations, bookmarks and notes.

Indeed, these copies of Joyce’s novel indicate that Khan returned to them frequently throughout his life. The 1945 edition, for instance, contains a folded slip of paper as bookmark on which is written what resembles one half of a conversation. This suggests it was used for Khan to communicate with his wife Svetlana Beriozsova when he was unable to speak. Linda Hopkins’ biography of Khan notes that when Khan was being treated in hospital for lung cancer he could not speak for some months (Hopkins 289-291). It becomes evident that Khan was reading *Ulysses* whilst undergoing treatment in hospital, and a scrap of medical dressing pressed between the pages further on would appear to confirm this. Khan chooses *Ulysses* in particular to read in hospital out of his own extensive library of over 3000 books, and the novel subsequently crops up in the book completed following his illness (*HS* 34).

The force of Joyce’s writing is indeed felt from the outset of his third book. In “Freud and the Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility,” Joyce’s voice offers the paradigmatic description of the experience of modernity as such. This move is typical of what Raymond Williams sees as one of the characteristic features of the critical discourse concerning modernist culture. Describing Williams’ posthumous *The Politics of Modernism*, Neil Lazarus summarizes the movement as one that “construed its own particular dispositions…as uniquely responsive to modernity” (Lazarus, 27). For Lazarus and Williams, Modernism “constructed its own…culturally specific protocols, procedures and horizons as those of the modern as such” (27). Khan, along these lines, elevates those major tropes of Euro-modernist culture—exile, homelessness, and cosmopolitanism—to the level of universal myth” (28).
Joyce’s writing is invoked in precisely these terms by Khan in the opening chapter of his 1983 book *Hidden Selves*. In this respect, we can see the ways in which Joyce expresses for Khan what he sees as the essential character of modern experience, and Khan’s implicit valuation of the importance of Joyce is very much in line with Nicholas Brown’s assessment that late colonial and early postcolonial educational institutions accorded enormous prestige to modernist literary texts (Brown 1). The “crisis of consciousness” of which Khan writes is represented as the fetishization of unconscious experience in aesthetics at the expense of any real relation to the world, a malaise that overtakes European culture as a whole:

… As Freud’s thought permeates the sensibility of European cultures, a new situation actualizes with artists and painters… Gradually the awake and rational ego began to envy the dreaming ego with its access to the unconscious… The aim of the artists and writers became a frenzied pursuit of the unconscious… Freud’s therapeutic responsibility helped the patient recall his repressed past into a significant self-narrative. With the Cubists, Dadaists and Surrealists, the narrative becomes utterly suspect. The artists strive to make of the image … an absolute space and reality from which they do not awaken themselves… Most creative effort was to become autotherapeutic and explore the dream-space. (*HS* 40-41)

Throughout the passage quoted above—essentially between every set of ellipses—there is a quote from Joyce pertaining to the problems presented. The preoccupation of the “writers and painters,” for instance, is explained by “Joyce’s pun, from *Finnegans Wake*… ‘Let us Pry’” (40). The predicament of the Cubists et al. is matched, accordingly, by Joyce: “Joyce was to claim: ‘Since 1922 my book [*Ulysses*] has been a greater reality to me than reality’” (41). Khan continues by claiming that “Molly Bloom’s nocturnal soliloquy, as it ends *Ulysses*, is a critical point in that crisis of consciousness which was to become the fate of Modernism in our times” (41).

Joyce offers Khan the “diagnosis” of this crisis and the new “therapeutic responsibility” with an “epiphanic conundrum” from *Finnegans Wake* (41). This crisis is conceived by way of Joyce’s language. In *The Privacy of the Self*, Khan’s analysis of Rousseau’s writing takes a Joycean turn: “With Rousseau self-experience was, to use James Joyce’s phrase ‘auto-mystic,’” gesturing towards the protagonist of Joyce’s 1918 play *Exiles*, the expatriate Richard Rowan (*Privacy* 111). *Exiles* examines Rowan’s return to Dublin after an elected exile in Europe owing to political disagreements about nationalism with his love rival in the play, the journalist Robert Hand. Rousseau’s “inconsolable isolation” is diagnosed by Khan via Joyce as the case of an “auto-mystic”—but this spiritual isolation, when read with Joyce’s play in mind as Khan does, can also be understood as a form of psychic exile, suggesting in turn that Joyce’s fascination with exile *in particular* is especially germane to Khan’s thought. (111)
But examining Khan’s interest in Joyce more closely indicates that epiphany and exile are in fact thoroughly intertwined, especially when considering Joyce’s *Stephen Hero*. The writer of epiphanies, in Joyce’s early semi-autobiographical novel, is also an outsider to the nationalist sentiments of his fellow students at university, and this rejection of the prevailing political position in Joyce’s novel is co-extensive with Stephen’s striving towards a new theory of aesthetic practice, realised through the rejection of collectivity and normative institutions—the church and the nation-state—and taking up self-exile. Stephen’s epiphantic theory of art is as contrary as his political position, and the realisation of the former entails renouncing his belonging to a single place. For Khan, this relationship of the epiphanic artist to the nation-state resonates with his own standoffish attitude towards India, Pakistan, and political changes attending Partition.

There are more precise examples of the coterminous nature of epiphany and exile in Khan’s engagements with Joyce. Quoting an “epiphanic conundrum” from *Finnegans Wake* in *Hidden Selves*, Khan points us towards a character who is described on the following pages as a “semi-semitic serendipitist”—one prone to accidental discoveries or fortuitous insights, like Khan’s psychoanalyst—and an exile, a “nomad” (190.32) and “hybrid” (169.9) who refuses integration: the “eastasian import” (166.32).

Shem Macadamson, you know me and I know you and all your shemeries. Where have you been in the uterim, enjoying yourself all the morning since your last wetbed confession? I advise you to conceal yourself, my little friend, as I have said a moment ago and put your hands in my hands and have a nightslong homely little confiteor about things. Let me see. It is looking pretty black against you, we suggest, Sheem avick. You will need all the elements in the river to clean you over it all and a fortifine popespriestspower bull of attender to booth. (*HS* 41).

In this dialogue between Justius/Brawn/Shaan and Mercius/Shem the penman, the more authoritarian Justius explicates and interprets Shem’s “birthwrong” as “shirking both your bullet and your billet” to “sing a song of alibi” (*FW* 190.28, 190.30). Joyce’s “diagnosis” and elaboration of the new psychotherapeutic responsibility, as Khan puts it, is concerned with the sadistic invasion of the privacy of the self by a hermeneutic approach that turns psychotherapy into little more than a confessional or “talkingto” (187.34). The unconscious becomes a site for the purification of transgressive desires and psychoanalysis a persecutory and invasive agency, punishing patients with interpretations. Khan again invokes Shaun’s remarks in *Finnegans Wake* to describe this invasion: “Let us Pry.” Such prying is, in Khan’s thought, destructive of the clinical environment and psychoanalytic process.

But this violation of Shem’s “privacy” by Shaun’s interrogation is also tied to his being an “Irish emigrant the wrong way out” (190.36). As a “semi-semitic serendipitist” (191.3), Shem is much like the psychoanalyst who cannot, and should not, predict when Balint’s “new beginning” will
arrive, but nevertheless has a talent for seeking it out. Such a “serendipitist” is criticized by Justius for his failure to “do your little thruppenny bit and earn from the nation true thanks,” an abdication of his responsibility to “do as all nationists must, and do a certain office” (190.19-20). His identity can only be tentatively articulated by Justius at the climax of his attack, and is a transcontinental collision: “(I think that describes you) Europasianized Afferyank!” (191.3-4). The difficulty in describing or defining Shem is clear —“(will you for the laugh of Shakepspair just help mine with the epithet?)” (191.2-3) —and calls into doubt Justius’ confident claim in the previous pages: “I know you and all your shemeries” (187.35-36). The serendipitist cannot be disentangled from the nomadic, transcontinental traveller, equipped with their own ethnic distinctiveness. In this way, epiphany in psychoanalysis is inextricable from Khan’s own particular circumstances as a non-white migrant in postwar London—refusing to belong in either London or Pakistan—and his subsequent cultivation of an exilic idiom.

Exilic Psychoanalysis

Joyce’s epiphanies find a psychoanalytic articulation in Khan’s writing. So too does his fascination with its thematic partner, exile. This motif is also translated into his psychoanalytic thinking, an example of which I offer by way of conclusion. The epiphanic psychoanalyst, in the logic of Khan’s writing, is inextricable from the exile, whom Khan imagines through Joyce, who is himself mobilised as Khan’s response to his particular historical and political circumstances. Khan’s sense of the private or hidden aspects of the self have been discussed illuminatingly by both Roger Willoughby in his biography of Khan, and Adam Phillips in On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored (Willoughby 186-187; Phillips 60-62). The privacy of the subject that Khan is so eager to protect through his epiphanic version of psychoanalysis pictures a subject who is fundamentally inaccessible: this abstract idea of the nature of subjectivity is in fact constructed, I suggest, through Khan’s special fascination with exile and transnationalism, and ultimately derives from his interest in Joyce’s modernist exile.

In “Beyond the Dreaming Experience,” Khan asks: “Who can communicate the whole of his self-experience through verbalization, to himself or the other? An essential part remains inaccessible” (HS 50). Likewise for Donald Winnicott, the dreaming subject, and the experience of unconscious life, is isolated: “At the centre of each person is an incommunicado element, and this is sacred and most worthy of preservation” (Winnicott 1963 187). By suggesting that “dreaming itself is beyond interpretation” (HS 47), Khan puts the subject of psychoanalysis beyond the reach of the traditional psychoanalytic hermeneutic apparatus. The state of non-integration Khan argues for in his discussion of dreaming
—“dreaming experience is an entirety that actualizes the self in an unknowable way” (46-47)—has been described by biographer Roger Willoughby as figuring for the impossibility of mapping Khan’s Punjabi unconscious onto European psychoanalytic thought (Willoughby 187). This can be taken further: the unintegrated dreaming subject is an exiled subject or stranger who cannot fully be brought into social reality. For Khan, the incommensurability of symbolization and unconscious experience is glossed in Freud’s writing as the concept of primary repression (HS 48).

The paper is Khan’s own “attempt to define significantly the space-potential of the dream towards self-experience,” and depends on a reformulation of Jean Pontalis’ dictum that “the speaking subject is the entire subject (‘Le sujet parlant est tout le sujet’)” as “The dreaming subject is the entire subject” (HS 45, 47). Khan shifts the focus in psychoanalytic thinking from interpretation of the dream-text produced in the analytic session to the meaning and importance of the experience of dreaming as such—“an entirety that actualizes the self in an unknowable way” (HS 47). This experience “never becomes fully available for ordinary mental articulation,” and its enriching potential can only be experienced in the analytic situation through the “mutuality of playing dialogue between the analyst and the patient in an atmosphere of trust in unknowing” (HS 47). The dreaming experience is both a space and state that exist, for Khan, beyond the reach of traditional analytic hermeneutics (“dreaming itself is beyond interpretation”) and even the analysand’s own speech (“dreaming and the remembered dream-text are not sufficiently differentiated from each other”) (HS 47). This dichotomy or tension between the private dreaming experience and the dream-text produced in the world of language can also be seen to have its antecedent in Joyce’s Stephen Hero, where Joyce notes that Stephen imagined the artist “standing in the position of mediator between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams” (Stephen Hero 77). This mediation occupies the position given in Winnicott’s theory to the transitional space.

Khan’s emphasis on the remoteness of states of experience such as this in his work—the unintegrated character of the richest and most generative aspects of psychic life—is the translation of his fascination with Joycean exiles into psychoanalytic theory. These aspects of self-experience resist, like the Joycean exile, full integration into a shared public domain, preferring inwardness and silence to collectivity: the most pervasive images of Khan’s Hidden Selves are of “aloneness,” “secretiveness” and, most strikingly, of the “mutually provocative silence” of his clinical encounters. Joyce provides Khan with a language that fashions the psychoanalytic writing of Balint, Winnicott, Freud and Pontalis into a theory of the subject overlaid with modernist notions of exile, travel and transnational cosmopolitanism, to which Khan turns in imagining his own antagonistic relationship with India, and his own ethnic and religious distinctiveness as a postcolonial migrant in London.
That it is exile, travel, and displacement in particular that furnish this characterisation of subjectivity is evident in the case opening Khan’s crucial discussion of the “private” subject in “Beyond the Dreaming Experience”: Khan tells the story of an exile whose entire family “had perished in the Nazi gas chambers” (HS, 43). Khan writes that “the patient had come to London from central Europe and money was to be delivered to her here with which she was to help bring the rest of her family to London” (43). The patient is betrayed and it becomes impossible for her family to escape. It is highly significant that Khan chooses an exile, and, even more strikingly, a victim of a paradigmatic twentieth century instance of mass displacement and homelessness to foreground his ideas about subjectivity. This example also significantly complicates the attitude towards Jewishness Khan most notoriously demonstrates in his final book, which led to his being denounced as racist. Whilst there is no doubt about the anti-Semitic content of When Spring Comes (which there is not room to reprise here), this moment in Hidden Selves indicates the presence of a more ambivalent identification with Jews, because of Khan placing a victim of Nazi persecution at the centre of his theory of subjectivity, and the emphasis he himself places on his exilic status. Indeed, this point is compounded by the prominent position the “semi-Semitic” Shem occupies in Khan’s elaborations of Joyce in his writing. Indeed, these two instances invite a further examination of the figuration of ethnicity and subjectivity in Khan’s life and work, which necessarily requires a paper all of its own. At the heart of his conception of psychic life Khan places the figure of the foreigner who, unlike the stranger welcomed in Kant’s version of cosmopolitanism, does not belong as a citizen to a sovereign nation (Bennington 1997). Political and psychic articulations of that which cannot become integrated occupy the same place in his writing. But this is nevertheless an uncomfortable convergence of historical and cultural forces: the modernist exile to which Khan is committed is made to figure for experiences and contexts far outside of its immediate purview, and Khan generalises a very specific cultivation of non-belonging through transforming it into a fundamental of psychoanalytic theory. It is Joyce’s epiphanies and Joyce’s exile that constitute Khan’s image of himself as a theorist and a subject of modernity, providing, at key points in Khan’s life and writing, a language of displacement and non-integration. But the availability of this language to Khan, one mobilised to index his own experiences of postcolonial modernity, perhaps indicates the limits of Euro-modernist discourse when it comes to describing the historical fallout of the end of empire for the many millions of migrants — most of whom, unlike Khan, did not carry a copy of Ulysses with them — traveling to new lives in the former colonial centre. Thus, Khan’s modernist self-fashioning perhaps opens a space for critique of writers and postcolonial exile — Salman Rushdie and V.S. Naipaul would be the most famous examples — whose own aesthetic and political projects are deeply indebted to their encounters with modernist culture, especially with respect to cosmopolitanism, alienation and exile.
Notes
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